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ARBITRATION-COURT, NOT ARBITRATOR, MUST DETER-
MINE THRESHOLD ISSUE WHETHER VALID CONTRACT TO 
ARBITRATE EXISTS. DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW 
REJECTED; COURT MUST UNDERTAKE DE NOVO REVIEW. 
Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Associates, 313 Md. 
652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in 
Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Associates, I deter-
mined: (1) absent an arbitration agreement between the parties, an arbi-
tration panel cannot validly assert jurisdiction to decide a dispute 
between them2 and (2) the proper procedure for reviewing a jurisdic-
tional challenge to an arbitration award is to conduct a de novo review to 
determine whether an agreement to arbitrate existed, giving no deference 
to views expressed by the arbitration panel. 3 
Arbitration is one of the oldest methods of settling disputes.4 It is a 
process which provides a speedy, informal, and relatively inexpensive 
procedure for resolving controversies arising out of commercial transac-
tions. 5 Under common law, parties could voluntarily agree to submit 
their disputes to arbitration. If an arbitrator's award was issued, it was 
enforced by the court unless the arbitrator was guilty of fraud or miscon-
duct or had exceeded his authority or had made a mistake in law or fact 
appearing on the face of the award.6 At common law, however, an arbi-
tration agreement was revocable at will by either party at any time before 
an award was rendered. 7 Absent statutory provisions to the contrary, 
courts often deemed executory agreements to arbitrate future disputes 
void as against public policy. 8 
1. 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). 
2. [d. at 658, 547 A.2d at 1051. 
3. [d. at 664,547 A.2d at 1054. The court also held that proceeding by cross-motions 
for summary judgment in circuit court does not amount to a waiver of de novo 
review. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
4. M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:02 (Prac. Guide) (1987). Modem ar-
bitration is derived from Roman law, "[w]here the arbitrator acted by virtue of 
contract between the parties, and his authority to decide the case came from the 
contract between them and himself." /d. (citing A. ENGELMAN, A HISTORY OF 
CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13, at 259 (1969». 
5. Bel Pre Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 315, 320 
A.2d 558, 563 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
6. /d. at 316, 320 A.2d at 564; see also NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 
524 F.2d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1975) ("If the arbitrator's award has deviated from the 
plain meaning of a labor contract provision, it must find support in the contract 
itself or in prior practices demonstrating relaxation of the literal language."). 
7. The only remedy a party would have at common law would be a suit for damages 
for breach of contract. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 116 
(1924). 
8. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959), 
cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); see also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 
§ 265 at 532 (1974) ("[T]he early courts were very jealous of their prerogative to 
decide controversies and resisted any attempts to oust them of their jurisdiction."). 
But see CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1433, at 391 (1962) ("It is confidently 
believed that the origin and survival of this rule as to Arbitration Agreements can 
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Common law governed arbitration in Maryland until the General 
Assembly enacted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (the Act) in 
1965.9 The Act is a radical departure from the common law because it 
grants legal enforceability to arbitration agreements to settle existing as 
well as future disputes. to It empowers courts of general jurisdiction to 
compel I I or stay arbitration,12 and to stay court action pending arbitra-
tion.13 The Act also empowers courts to vacate arbitrator's awards, and 
sets forth grounds and procedures for such actions.14 The Act is silent, 
however, on the standard of review a court should apply to an arbitra-
tor's decision on the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel to hear the dis-
pute at issue. IS 
Prior to 1988, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had not addressed 
directly the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards under the Act. 
At common law, however, Maryland courts gave great deference to the 
arbitrator's award unless it clearly was the result of partiality or corrup-
tion. 16 Courts refused to review arbitration awards on the merits because 
"the purpose of arbitration is 'to compose disputes in a simple and inex-
pensive manner' " and extensive judicial review would defeat this pur-
pose. 17 As the court of appeals in Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. 
Doughnut Corp. of America 18 stated: 
The reason for this doctrine is that an award by arbitrators is 
the decision of a tribunal which the parties themselves have cre-
ated, and by whose judgment they have mutually agreed to 
abide. Very often these tribunals are without legal training, 
and the purpose of the parties in creating them is to have their 
disputes settled speedily and inexpensively by a decision which 
will be final and unalterable. Obviously, if the decision of such 
a tribunal should be subject to review under the strict rules of 
the law, the arbitration, instead of promoting economy and fi-
not be explained by any supposed jealously of their 'jurisdiction' by the 
judges .... "). 
9. 1965 Md. Laws 243 (codified as amended at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3-201 to -234 (1984». 
10. Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. at 319-20, 320 A.2d 
at 565. 
11. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-207 (1984). 
12. Id. § 3-208. 
13. Id. § 3-209; see also McCormick v. 9690 Deerco Road, 79 Md. App. 177,556 A.2d 
292 (1989). 
14. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224; see also Board of Educ. of Charles 
County v. Education Ass'n of Charles County, 286 Md. 358, 366,408 A.2d 89, 91-
93 (1979). 
15. See Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 657-
60,547 A.2d 1048, 1051-53 (1988). 
16. Schreiber v. Pacific Coast Fire Ins. Co., 195 Md. 639, 647, 75 A.2d 108, 112 (1949). 
17. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Prince George's County Educators' 
Ass'n, 309 Md. 85, 98, 522 A.2d 931, 937 (1987) (quoting Roberts v. Consumers 
Can Co., 102 Md. 362, 368-69, 62 A. 585, 587 (1905». 
18. 186 Md. 669,48 A.2d 447 (1946). 
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nality, would generally be but a forerunner to protracted 
litigation. 19 
Thus, mere errors of law or fact would not constitute grounds for a court 
to vacate or refuse enforcement of an arbitration award.20 
Similarly, under the Federal Arbitration Act,21 courts refuse to va-
cate arbitration awards unless they reflect a "manifest disregard of the 
law."22 In Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher,23 Judge Aldis-
ert stated: 
'[M]ere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators 
to understand or apply the law' will not justify judicial inter-
vention, and the courts' function in confirming or vacating a 
commercial award is 'severely limited.' If it were otherwise, the 
ostensible purpose for resort to arbitration, i.e., avoidance of 
litigation, would be frustrated. 24 
State courts began to uniformly apply this standard, which is commonly 
referred to as the "completely irrational standard. "25 
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has yet to apply the 
completely irrational standard, the court of special appeals seized the op-
portunity in O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc.,26 where Judge Lowe 
19. [d. at 674, 48 A.2d at 449. 
20. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 309 Md. at 99, 522 A.2d at 937. Early 
cases suggest a greater willingness to set aside awards for errors of law. See, e.g., 
State v. Williams, 9 Gill. 172, 175 (1850); Heuitt v. State, 6 H. & J. 95, 97-98 (1823); 
Thompson v. Heap & Allen, 2 H. & McH. 477 (1790). But cf Goldsmith v. Tilly, 1 
H. & J. 361, 364 (1802). 
21. 9 U.S.c. §§ 1-14 (1988). 
22. Carte Blanche (Singapore) v. Carte Blanche Int'l, 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1989): 
"Manifest disregard of the law" by the arbitrators is a judicially-created 
ground for vacating their arbitration award .... It is not to be found in 
federal arbitration law. Although the bounds of this ground have never 
been defined, it clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with 
respect to the law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being 
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as 
an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator 
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides 
to ignore or pay no attention to it. 
[d. at 265 (citations omitted). 
23. 405 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1969). 
24. /d. at 1127 (quoting Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 
577, 582 (1967) (footnotes omitted). Although Ludwig was decided under § 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947), Judge Aldisert's 
analysis of the Federal Arbitration Act is persuasive and is often cited by federal 
and state courts. See infra note 25. . 
25. Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d. Cir. 1972) (citing 
Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634-35, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418,419 
(1972) as a fair rendition of Ludwig); see also Nelson Paving Co. v. Hjelle, 207 
N.W.2d 225, 233 (1973). 
26. 29 Md. App. 406, 348 A.2d 870 (1975). See Snyder v. Berliner Constr. Co., 79 Md. 
App. 29, 555 A.2d 523 (1989). The court of special appeals recently held that the 
completely irrational standard applies when the arbitrator's decision was a substan-
tive rather than a procedural determination. [d. at 39, 555 A.2d at 527. 
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stated: 
We hold that when reviewing the fruits of an arbitrator's 
award, a judge may withhold only such as were tainted by im-
probity or based on a completely irrational interpretation of the 
contract. We recognize the very limited extension of the re-
viewing court's scope of review to include authority to vacate 
an award that is "completely irrational." Statutory support for 
this is found not only in the fact that arbitrators "exceeded 
their powers" when they reach a completely irrational result, 
but also in the connotation of the words "undue means" in Sec. 
3-224(b)( 1).27 
Accordingly, a court would be justified in applying the completely irra-
tional standard where the language of a contract subject to arbitration 
allows for only one interpretation, yet the arbitrator failed to follow the 
clear contractual mandate. In such a case, a court could properly vacate 
the award. 28 
On the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, federal courts 
remain steadfast in favor of arbitration. Beginning with the Steelworkers 
Trilogy cases of 1960,29 the Supreme Court established federal guidelines 
for grievance arbitration by defining the respective provinces of both the 
court and the arbitrator.3o Courts, when determining arbitrability, rely 
on the following criteria established by the Trilogy: (1) that an agree-
ment exists,31 (2) that it provides for arbitration,32 and (3) that a claim 
has been made that a provision of the agreement has been violated.33 In 
cases where these criteria are met but doubt exists as to whether or not a 
specific issue should be arbitrated, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that it favors determination by the arbitrator.34 The Court, however, has 
27. O-S Corp., 29 Md. App. at 408-09, 348 A.2d at 872 (emphasis in original). The 
court of appeals has never approved the application of the completely irrational 
standard. Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. at 
652,659, 547 A.2d 1048, 1051 (1988). 
28. O-S Corp., 29 Md. App. at 410, 348 A.2d at 873. 
29. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
30. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581-83; Enterprise 
Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596-99. Although the cases comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy 
concerned labor arbitration, their principles are generally applied to commercial 
arbitration as well. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Gold Coast Mall v. Lamar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103, 
468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983). 
31. A.T. & T. Technologies v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986) (citing Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582). 
32. [d. at 649 (citing Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83 and Atkinson v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)). 
33. A. T. & T., 475 U.S. at 649-50 (citing American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 582). 
34. Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority stated: 
[T]he judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the question 
whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or agreed 
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failed to define the scope of the arbitrator's authority to decide the issue 
of arbitrability itself when the arbitrator's jurisdiction is challenged.3s 
In Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,36 the 
Supreme Court established that if a case is brought within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act,37 the scope of arbitration is broad. 38 
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is 
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation 
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.39 
Moreover, the Court stated that the Federal Act is "a congressional dec-
laration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration ~greements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the con-
trary."40 The recent Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 41 supports this position.42 
to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made. An order to 
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be 
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of 
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be re-
solved in favor of coverage. 
Id. at 582-83. 
35. See McDermott, Arbitrability: The Courts Versus the Arbitrator, 23 ARBITRATION 
J. 18, 23 (1968). But see Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 588 n.7 (1960) (the question of 
arbitrability is for the courts to decide). 
36. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
37. 9 U.S.c. §§ 1-15 (1982). 
38. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. 
39.Id. 
40. Id. at 24 n.32. 
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal 
court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing 
and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not 
create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1331 ... or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbi-
tration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a 
suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizen-
ship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the 
order can issue. . . . Section 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the 
extent that a federal court cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there 
is such a suit in existence. Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act 
is left in large part to the state courts, it nevertheless represents federal 
policy to be vindicated by the federal courts where otherwise appropriate. 
41. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
42. [d. at 625-26. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., Mit-
subishi and Soler entered into a sales agreement which provided for arbitration in 
the event of a breach. When Mitsubishi sought to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment, Soler claimed that the dispute included antitrust causes of action under the 
Sherman Act, which Soler had not intended to arbitrate. Moreover, Soler argued 
that rights conferred by the antitrust laws were of a character inappropriate for 
enforcement by arbitration. [d. at 621. The Court held that the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correctly determined that the parties' agree-
ment to arbitrate reached the antitrust issues and that no legal constraints external 
606 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
Maryland courts have yet to apply the Federal Arbitration Act,43 
and, in cases involving issues similar to those decided by the Supreme 
Court, Maryland courts have produced contrary results. In Frederick 
Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center,44 for example, the court of 
appeals held that threshold procedural issues, such as the timeliness of a 
demand for arbitration, are to be decided by the court, not by the arbitra-
tor.45 A similar finding relative to procedural issues was made in Litton 
Bionetics v. Glen Construction CO.46 
The issue of whether or not a party waives its rights to judicial re-
view of arbitrability by participating in arbitration is generally ap-
proached by courts in two ways.47 The first approach is exemplified in 
the court of appeals decision in Messersmith. When a party submits the 
to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. [d. at 628. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun noted the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration: 
There is no reason to depart from these guidelines where a party bound by 
an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights. Some 
time ago this Court expressed "hope for the Act's usefulness both in con-
troversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise created," and we 
are well passed the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbi-
tration and the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibit the development of 
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. 
[d. at 626-27 (citation omitted). 
43. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act is the state analogue to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act. Regina v. Envirmech, 80 Md. App. 662, 667, 565 A.2d 693, 696 
(1989). In Litton Bionetics v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34,437 A.2d 208 (1981), 
the court of appeals considered the Federal Arbitration Act in its analysis but did 
not apply the Act. 
44. 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
45. /d. at 314-15,334 A.2d at 530-31. The court of special appeals, however, held that 
the issue of timeliness was to be decided by the arbitrator. Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. 
Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 302 A.2d 558 (1974). But see Moses 
H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983) ("[T]he timeli-
ness issue is for the arbitrator to decide."). 
46. 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981). In Litton, the court of appeals addressed the 
issue of whether a circuit court has the power to order that the arbitration of a 
dispute between a building owner and the building's architect be consolidated with 
the arbitration of disputes between the owner and the general contractor. Neither 
agreement required or prohibited consolidation. Nevertheless, the court invested 
itself with the power to order the consolidation of arbitration agreements pursuant 
to § 3-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states: "An agree-
ment providing for arbitration under the law of the State confers jurisdiction on a 
court to enforce the agreement and enter judgment on an arbitration award." [d. at 
53, 437 A.2d at 218. 
The late Honorable Rita Davidson, joined by Judges Smith and Digges dis-
sented, stating: "I am unwilling to construe the words 'enforce the agreement,' ap-
pearing in § 3-202 as expanding judicial jurisdiction to include authorization to 
consolidate arbitration proceedings. I, therefore, find nothing in the language of 
§ 3-202 that authorizes judicial interference with arbitration procedures established 
by the agreement of the parties." [d. at 58-59, 437 A.2d at 221; see also Stauffer 
Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 54 Md. App. 658, 666, 460 
A.2d 609, 613 (1983) ("threshold issue is for the court to decide"). . 
47. See Annotation, Participation in Arbitration as Waiver of Objections to Arbitrability, 
33 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1970); 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 48, 50, 83 (1962). 
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controversy to the arbitrators, but at the same time challenges arbi-
trability by reserving the right to challenge in court an adverse ruling on 
arbitrability, the court decides the arbitrability issue de novo. If the arbi-
trators decide they have jurisdiction, the parties proceed to arbitrate the 
dispute, maintaining the right to appeal on the grounds that the arbitra-
tors lacked jurisdiction.48 In this instance, the objecting party is not re-
quired to seek an injunction of the arbitration or to withdrawal from the 
proceeding; the party simply is required to object on the record.49 
The second approach requires the objecting party to either not par-
ticipate in the arbitration proceeding, or in the alternative, to seek a stay 
of the proceeding. 50 Either method allows the court to first determine 
the threshold issue of arbitrability before proceeding through arbitration 
on the merits. If the objecting party proceeds with arbitration, the 
court's review is limited strictly to questions of fraud, mistake, or 
misconduct. 51 
In Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Associates,52 Barclay 
Townhouse Associates (Barclay) contracted with Henry A. Knott Re-
modeling Company, Inc. (Knott) for Knott to manage a construction 
project. 53 Knott subcontracted with Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. (Mes-
sersmith) to perform specific construction work on the project. Messer-
smith commenced work without a signed contract. 54 Subsequently, at 
Messersmith's request, the parties held a meeting to finalize the contract 
at which a Knott representative added a handwritten provision requiring 
binding arbitration of disputes between the parties. 55 This provision was 
initialled by Knott and Messersmith; the contract was signed by Messer-
smith but not by Knott or Barclay.56 
Thereafter, disputes arose between Messersmith and Knott regard-
ing the quality of Messersmith's work and his failure to receive payment 
for work already completed. 57 Messersmith filed a demand for arbitra-
48. Local 719, American Bakery & Confectionary Workers v. National Biscuit Co., 378 
F.2d 918,921 (3d Cir. 1967); R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. Loca1275 of the United 
Bhd. of Carpenter's, 686 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1988); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. 
Local 153, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F. Supp. 850, 857 (D. N.J. 1978), 
aff'd, 609 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980); Arrow Over-
all Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters., 414 Mich. 95, 100, 323 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1982). 
49. 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). 
50. Caltagirone v. School Bd. of Hernando County, 355 So. 2d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978); L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Tex. 1977); 
National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377,382, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305, 208 
N.Y.S.2d 951,955 (1960); Rosser v. Hochwalt, 12 Ohio App. 2d 129,231 N.E.2d 
334, 337 (1967). 
51. See supra notes 6, 20, 24 and accompanying text. 
52. 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). 
53. Id. at 654, 547 A.2d at 1049. 
54. Id. at 655, 547 A.2d at 1049. 
55.Id. 
56. Id. at 655-56, 547 A.2d at 1049. 
57. Id. at 656, 547 A.2d at 1050. 
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tion seeking an award against Knott and Barclay.58 Knott and Barclay 
challenged the arbitration panel's jurisdiction on the basis that no written 
agreement to arbitrate existed. 59 The arbitration panel overruled the 
objections and a full hearing followed. 6O The arbitrators found for 
Messersmith.61 
Barclay petitioned the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award 
on the grounds that it had never agreed to submit to arbitration.62 The 
parties agreed to proceed by cross-motions for summary judgment. 63 
The circuit court denied Barclay's motion for summary judgment and 
petition to vacate and granted Messersmith's motion.64 The court of spe-
cial appeals remanded the case with instructions that the circuit court 
undertake a de novo review to determine whether an agreement to arbi-
trate existed. 65 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Messer-
smith's petition for a writ of certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the 
court of special appeals.66 
In Messersmith, the court of appeals reaffirmed the principle first 
enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy,67 that "the question of whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbi-
trator."68 The court construed the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 
particularly sections 3-208 and 3-224(b), to support its views and con-
cluded that Barclay's participation in the arbitration subsequent to its 
objection was inconsequential. 69 
Messersmith argued that a judicial proceeding pursuant to section 3-
208 is by necessity a de novo proceeding while 3-224(b) requires a record 
review and is not a de novo proceeding.7o Rejecting Messersmith's argu-
ment, the court found that by including the permissive "may" in section 
3-208, the General Assembly's intention was to permit a party to raise 
the issue of jurisdiction after arbitration, as did Barclay.71 Moreover, the 
court noted that neither section 3-208 nor 3-224(b) provides specifically 




61. [d. The arbitrators awarded Messersmith $63,395.13 plus costs and interest against 
Barclay. Barclay Townhouse Associates v. Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc., 67 Md. 
App. 493, 495, 508 A.2d 507, 508 (1986). 
62. Messersmith, 313 Md. at 656, 547 A.2d at 1050. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. 
65. Barclay Townhouse, 67 Md. App. at 498, 508 A.2d at 510. 
66. Messersmith, 313 Md. at 652, 547 A.2d at 1048. 
67. See supra note 29. 
68. Messersmith, 313 Md. at 662, 547 A.2d at 1052 (quoting A.T. & T. Technologies, 
Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)); see also supra 
notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
69. Messersmith, 313 Md. at 663, 547 A.2d at 1053. 
70. [d.; see also Brief for Appellant at 12, Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay 
Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988) (No. 86-83). 
71. Messersmith, 313 Md. at 663, 547 A.2d at 1053. 
1989] Steven L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Assoc. 609 
thorize a court either to stay or invalidate an arbitration proceeding. 72 
The court concluded that application of a deferential standard of 
review is appropriate only where the parties indisputably agree to submit 
to arbitration.73 When an arbitration award is attacked for lack of juris-
diction, however, "the proper procedure for reviewing cases arising 
under Section 3-224(b)(5) is to conduct a de novo review."74 
Finally, the court rejected Messersmith's contention that Barclay 
waived its right to a de novo review when it consented to proceed by 
cross-motions for summary judgment. 75 The court reasoned that sub-
mission of a motion for summary judgment suggests a preference for an 
expedited procedure, not a waiver of a party's substantive right to a de 
novo review. 76 
The court of appeals was warranted in holding that "the question of 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not 
the arbitrator" because it is consistent with the traditional approach es-
tablished by the Steelworkers TrilogyJ7 The court, however, relies on 
no direct authority to support its finding that Barclay was entitled to a de 
novo review.78 The court's reliance on Frederick Contractors 79 is suspect 
because it is in direct contradiction of the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Moses Cone Hospital. 80 
Arguably, a deferential standard of review may result in a funda-
mental denial of due process to the objecting party.81 Whether an agree-
ment exists, however, is a threshold issue that should be determined at 
the outset, not at a subsequent de novo trial. No purpose is served by 
permitting a party to object on the grounds that no arbitration agreement 
exists, and then to continue with arbitration, only to have the threshold 
issue subsequently determined by the circuit court in a trial de novo. As 
Messersmith argued,82 this allows the objecting party to attempt to win 
on the merits, and, if unsuccessful, to secure a second chance of obtaining 
a favorable result by challenging the panel's jurisdiction. Considerations 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 659, 547 A.2d at 1051. 
74. [d. at 664, 547 A.2d at 1054. 
75. [d. at 665, 547 A.2d at 1054. 
76. /d. 
77. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
78. Messersmith, 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988). Every case the court relies on to 
support Barclay's de novo review is actually a reaffirmation that the threshold ques-
tion of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to 
decide. One exception is Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co. 253 
N. Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930). But see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
79. 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). 
80. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also supra notes 38-39, 44-45 and accompanying text. 
81. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see 
also MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 24. 
82. See Brief of Appellant at 9, Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse 
Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 547 A.2d 1048 (1988) (No. 86-83). 
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of equity and fairness dictate that the objecting party should be required 
to stay the arbitration proceeding while a determination of the existence 
of an agreement is made by a court.83 
Although the court of appeals relies on the 1930 New York case, 
Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & CO.,84 to support its 
statutory interpretation of the Maryland Arbitration Act, it fails to rec-
ognize that the modem New York statute provides for a mandatory stay 
when it is asserted that there is no valid arbitration agreement. 85 The 
Messersmith court also relies on Arrow Overall Supply v. Peloquin Enter-
prises;86 in Arrow, however, the court, while acknowledging that the 
Michigan statute provides for, but does not mandate a stay, asserted its 
preference for a stay and presented policy reasons to support this prefer-
ence.87 The Messersmith court indicated no preference. 
When the Maryland General Assembly initially adopted the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, section 2(a) of the Act stated: 
On application of a party showing an agreement described 
in Section 1, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the 
court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if 
the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to ar-
bitrate, the court shall proceed expeditiously to the determina-
tion of the issues so raised and shall order arbitration if found 
for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be 
denied. 88 
In 1973, the Commission to Revise the Annotated Code of Maryland 
reorganized the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act so that former sec-
tion 2(a) of the Act became section 3-207.89 Section 3-207 presently 
reads: 
(a) Refusal to arbitrate. - If a party to an arbitration agree-
ment described in § 3-202 refuses to arbitrate, the other 
party may file a petition with a court to order arbitration. 
(b) Denial of existence of arbitration agreement. - If the op-
posing party denies existence of an arbitration agreement, 
the court shall proceed expeditiously to determine if the 
agreement exists. 
(c) Determination by court. - If the court determines that the 
agreement exists, it shall order arbitration. Otherwise it 
83. New York's arbitration statute, for example, provides that "a party must stay the 
arbitration proceeding or he shall thereafter be precluded from objecting that a valid 
agreement was not made or has not been complied with." N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 
7503 (McKINNEY 1985). 
84. 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930). 
85. See supra note 83. 
86. 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.W.2d I (1982). 
87. Id. at 100, 323 N.W.2d at 3. 
88. 1965 Md. Laws 243, 244 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, § 2 (1968». 
89. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROe. CODE ANN. § 3-207 (1984). 
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shall deny the petition.90 
Although the language is similar to that of the Act originally 
adopted by the General Assembly, the revised section requires a party to 
file a petition with a court to order arbitration if the opposing party de-
nies the existence of the agreement. This presupposes that the opposing 
party will refuse to attend the arbitration or, in the alternative, will seek a 
stay of the proceeding as provided by section 3-208. Nothing in the orig-
inal or revised statute indicates that the legislature would approve of the 
court's determining a threshold issue of jurisdiction after the arbitration 
proceeding. In fact, the only support for this method is found in section 
3-224(b)(5) which states: 
(b) Grounds. - The court shall vacate an award if: 
(5) There was no arbitration agreement as described in § 3-
206, the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings 
under § 3-208, and the party did not participate in the ar-
bitration hearing without raising the objection.91 
Yet the inclusion of the clause "the issue was not adversely determined in 
proceedings under § 3-208" in section 3-224(b)(5), which provides for a 
stay of arbitration, suggests that section 3-208 would be implemented 
prior to section 3-224(b)(5). At the least, the language is ambiguous. 
The plain language of section 2(a) of the original statute indicates 
the legislature's strong preference to have the threshold issue of jurisdic-
tion decided by the courts prior to arbitration. The word "expeditiously" 
emphasizes that the court should decide the issue with speed and effi-
ciency, not after the arbitration panel proceeding. 
By increasingly circumscribing the authority of arbitrators, the 
Maryland courts are effectively discouraging reliance on arbitration as a 
more efficient, less expensive alternative to litigation.92 If Maryland 
maintains this posture, arbitration could become so cumbersome that it 
would no longer serve its original purpose. Additionally, the court's fail-
ure to suggest that the arbitrators should stay the proceedings while the 
threshold issue of arbitrability is decided allows the objecting party an 
opportunity to better his position and further complicate a dispute in an 
90. Id. (emphasis added). 
91. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-224(b)(5) (1984). 
92. See, e.g., Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitration Awards, 62 TuL. L. REV. 
1113-14 (1988) (quoting the State of the judiciary Address by Chief Justice Burger, 
reprinted in 109 N.J.L.J., Feb. 4, 1982 at I, col. 4). Chief Justice Burger, in his 
State of the judiciary Address, called for an increased reliance on arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation. The Chief Justice made specific reference to the "litigation 
explosion" and the need to find viable alternatives: 
We must now use the inventiveness, the ingenuity, and the resource-
fulness that have long characterized the American business and legal com-
munity, to shape new tools .... Against this background I focus today on 
arbitration, not as the answer or cure-all for the mushrooming case loads 
of the courts, but as one example of "a better way to do it." 
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attempt to avoid arbitration. Likewise, under the procedure adopted in 
Messersmith, the party that prevails in arbitration loses its contractual 
right to the finality of the award as well as the savings of time and ex-
pense that arbitration provides. 
In order to maintain efficient arbitration, the Maryland General As-
sembly should amend the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act to ex-
pressly require that the objecting party seek a stay of the arbitration 
proceeding so that participation in the proceeding after objecting to juris-
diction would constitute an effective waiver of a right to full judicial re-
view. In the event of legislative inaction, the courts should not condone 
such practice, but should affirmatively assert a preference for determina-
tion of arbitrability prior to the proceeding. This posture would well 
reflect the legislative intent first manifested in the enactment of the 
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, and would further the purpose of 
the arbitration process - to provide a speedy and inexpensive alternative 
to litigation. 
Julia Kingsley Evans 
